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Abstract
The pricing, hedging, optimal exercise and optimal cancellation of
game or Israeli options are considered in a multi-currency model with pro-
portional transaction costs. Efficient constructions for optimal hedging,
cancellation and exercise strategies are presented, together with numerical
examples, as well as probabilistic dual representations for the bid and ask
price of a game option.
Keywords: game options, game contingent claims, Israeli options, propor-
tional transaction costs, currency model, superhedging, optimal exercise.
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1 Introduction
The study of game options (also called Israeli options) date back to the semi-
nal work of Kifer (2000); the recent survey paper by Kifer (2013a) provides a
complete chronology and literature review. In addition to being of interest as
derivative securities in their own right, game options have also played an im-
portant role in the study of other derivatives, for example callable options (e.g.
Ku¨hn & Kyprianou 2007) and convertible bonds (e.g. Kallsen & Ku¨hn 2005,
Bielecki, Cre´pey, Jeanblanc & Rutkowski 2008, Wang & Jin 2009).
A game option is a contract between a writer (the seller) and the holder
(the buyer) whereby a pre-specified payoff is delivered by the seller to the buyer
at the earliest of the exercise time (chosen by the buyer) and the cancellation
time (chosen by the seller). If the game option is cancelled before or at the same
time as being exercised, then the seller also pays a cancellation penalty to the
buyer. A game option is thus essentially an American option with the additional
provision that the seller can cancel the option at any time before expiry, thus
forcing early exercise at a price (the penalty). In practice, this feature tends to
reduce costs for both the seller and the buyer, which makes game options an
attractive alternative to American options.
It has been well observed that arbitrage pricing of European and American
options in incomplete friction-free models and models with proportional trans-
action costs result in a range of arbitrage-free prices, bounded from below by
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the bid price and from above by the ask price (see e.g. Fo¨llmer & Schied 2002,
Bensaid, Lesne, Page`s & Scheinkman 1992, Chalasani & Jha 2001, Roux & Zastawniak
2015). The same holds true for game options (Kallsen & Ku¨hn 2005, Kifer
2013b).
The pricing and hedging of game options in the presence of proportional
transaction costs also share a number of other important properties with their
European and American counterparts. (The properties for European and Amer-
ican options mentioned below were all established by Roux & Zastawniak (2015)
in a similar technical setting to the present paper.) Firstly, similar to European
options, the hedging of game options is symmetric in the sense that the hedging
problem for the buyer is exactly the same as the hedging problem for the seller
(of a different game option with related payoff). Kifer (2013b) observed this
property in a two-asset model.
Kifer (2013b) also showed that the probabilistic dual representations of the
bid and ask prices of game options contain so-called randomised stopping times,
a feature shared with the ask price of an American option (for which it was first
observed by Chalasani & Jha 2001). Randomised (or mixed) stopping times
have been studied by Baxter & Chacon (1977) and many others, primarily as
an aid to show the existence and properties of optimal ordinary stopping times.
Randomised stopping times can be thought of as convex combinations of ordi-
nary stopping times in a well-defined sense. The reason for the appearance of
randomised stopping times in the probabilistic dual representations of the bid
and ask prices is that, in the presence of transaction costs, the most expensive
exercise (cancellation) strategy for the seller (buyer) of a game option to hedge
against is not necessarily the same as the exercise (cancellation) strategy that
is most attractive to the buyer (seller). As a result, it generally costs the seller
(buyer) more to hedge against all exercise (cancellation) strategies than against
the best exercise (cancellation) strategy for the buyer (seller). It turns out
that the seller (buyer) must in effect be protected against a certain randomised
exercise (cancellation) time.
Furthermore, similar to a long American option (i.e. the buyer’s case), the
pricing and hedging problems for both the buyer and seller of game option are
inherently non-convex. Thus ideas beyond convex duality are needed to study
these problems. Nevertheless, the link between game options and short Ameri-
can options (i.e. the seller’s case, a convex problem) means that convex duality
methods still have an important role to play in establishing the probabilistic
dual representations.
In this paper we consider the pricing and hedging of game options in the
nume´raire-free discrete-time model of foreign exchange markets introduced by
Kabanov (1999), where proportional transaction costs are modelled as bid-ask
spreads between currencies. This model has been well studied by Kabanov & Stricker
(2001), Kabanov, Ra´sonyi & Stricker (2002), Schachermayer (2004) and others
(see also Kabanov & Safarian 2009).
The main aims of our work are twofold. Firstly, we present construc-
tive algorithms for computing optimal exercise and cancellation times together
with optimal hedging strategies for both the buyer and seller of a game op-
tion in this model. The algorithmic constructions in this paper are closely
related to previously developed algorithms for the pricing and hedging of Eu-
ropean and American options under proportional transaction costs (see e.g.
Lo¨hne & Rudloff 2014, Roux & Zastawniak 2009, 2015). These existing con-
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structions yield efficient numerical algorithms; in particular they are known
to price path-independent options in polynomial time in recombinant models
(which typically have exponentially-sized state spaces). Numerical examples
that illustrate the constructions are provided. Secondly, we establish proba-
bilistic dual representations for the bid and ask prices of game options. In both
these contributions we extend the recent results of Kifer (2013b) for game op-
tions from two-asset to multi-asset models. Our proofs are rigorous, thus closing
two gaps in the arguments of Kifer (2013b); see Remark 3.9, the comments below
Proposition 3.13 and Example 5.2 for further details.
The methods used in this paper come from convex analysis and dynamic pro-
gramming, and in particular we will use recent results from Roux & Zastawniak
(2015) for an American option with random expiration date. The restriction to
finite state space is motivated by the desire to produce computationally efficient
algorithms for pricing and hedging. The restriction to discrete time is justified
by a recent negative result by Dolinsky (2013) that the super-replication price
of a game option in continuous time under proportional transaction costs is the
initial value of a trivial buy-and-hold superhedging strategy.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 specifies the currency
model with proportional transaction costs, and reviews various notions concern-
ing randomised stopping times and approximate martingales. The main algo-
rithms for pricing and hedging together with theoretical results for the seller’s
and buyer’s position are presented in Section 3, with the proofs of all results
deferred to Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper with three numerical ex-
amples.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Proportional transaction costs
The nume´raire free currency model of Kabanov (1999) has discrete trading dates
t = 0, . . . , T and is based on a finite probability space (Ω,F , P ) with filtration
(Ft)Tt=0. The model contains d currencies (or assets), and at any time t, one
unit of currency j = 1, . . . , d may be obtained by exchanging piijt > 0 units
of currency i = 1, . . . , d. We assume that piiit = 1 for i = 1, . . . , d, i.e. every
currency may be freely exchanged for itself.
Assume that the filtration (Ft)Tt=0 is generated by (piijt )Tt=0 for i, j = 1, . . . , d,
and assume for simplicity that F0 = {∅,Ω}, that FT = F = 2Ω and that
P (ω) > 0 for all ω ∈ Ω. Write Lτ for the family of Fτ -measurable Rd-valued
random variables for every stopping time τ , and write L+τ for the family of
non-negative random variables in Lτ .
Let Ωt be the set of atoms of Ft for t = 0, . . . , T . The elements of Ωt are
called the nodes of the model at time t. A node ν ∈ Ωt+1 is called a successor to
a node µ ∈ Ωt if ν ⊂ µ. The collection of successors of µ is denoted succµ. We
shall implicitly and uniquely identify random variables f in Lt with functions
µ 7→ fµ ∈ Rd on Ωt, and likewise every set A ∈ Lt that we will consider will be
implicitly and uniquely defined by a set-valued mapping µ 7→ Aµ ⊆ Rd on Ωt
such that
A = {f ∈ Lt : fµ ∈ Aµ for all µ ∈ Ωt} .
A portfolio x = (x1, . . . , xd) ∈ Lτ is called solvent at a stopping time τ if it
3
can be exchanged into a portfolio in L+τ without any additional investment, i.e. if
there exist non-negative Fτ -measurable random variables βij for i, j = 1, . . . , d
such that
xi +
d∑
j=1
βji −
d∑
j=1
βijpiijτ ≥ 0 for all i = 1, . . . , d.
Write Kτ for the family of solvent portfolios at time τ ; then the solvency cone
Kτ is the convex cone generated by the canonical basis e1, . . . , ed of Rd and the
vectors piijτ e
i−ej for i, j = 1, . . . , d. Observe that Kτ is a polyhedral cone, hence
closed.
A self-financing trading strategy y = (yt)
T
t=0 is an R
d-valued predictable
process with initial endowment y0 ∈ L0 satisfying yt − yt+1 ∈ Kt for all t =
0, . . . , T − 1. Denote the family of self-financing trading strategies by Φ.
A self-financing trading strategy y = (yt) ∈ Φ is called an arbitrage opportu-
nity if y0 = 0 and there exists some x ∈ L+T \ {0} such that yT − x ∈ KT . This
definition of arbitrage is consistent with (though formally different to) that of
Schachermayer (2004) and Kabanov & Stricker (2001) (who called it weak ar-
bitrage).
For any non-empty convex cone A ⊆ Rd, write A∗ for the positive polar
of A, i.e.
A∗ := {x ∈ Rd : x · y ≥ 0 for all y ∈ A}.
Theorem 2.1 (Kabanov & Stricker (2001)). The model is free of arbitrage if
and only if there exists a probability measure P equivalent to P and an Rd-valued
P-martingale S = (St)
T
t=0 such that
St ∈ K∗t \ {0} for t = 0, . . . , T.
Any pair (P, S) satisfying the conditions of Theorem 2.1 is called an equiv-
alent martingale pair. Denote the family of equivalent martingale pairs by P ;
then P 6= ∅ in the absence of arbitrage.
Remark 2.2. Theorem 2.1 and the other results in this paper can equivalently
be formulated in terms of consistent pricing processes (Zt)
T
t=0 where
Zt = StEP
(
dP
dP
∣∣∣∣Ft
)
for all t = 0, . . . , T.
Schachermayer (2004, pp. 24–25) provides further details on this equivalence.
Assume for the remainder of this paper that the model contains no arbitrage.
2.2 Randomised stopping times
Definition 2.3 (Randomised stopping time). A randomised (or mixed) stopping
time χ = (χt)
T
t=0 is an adapted nonnegative process satisfying
T∑
t=0
χt = 1.
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Denote the set of randomised stopping times by X , and the set of (ordi-
nary) stopping times with values in 0, . . . , T by T . Every stopping time τ ∈ T
corresponds to a randomised stopping time χτ = (χτt )
T
t=0 defined as
χτt := 1{τ=t} for t = 0, . . . , T,
where 1 is the indicator function on Ω. The set X is the convex hull of
{χτ : τ ∈ T } and so X can be thought of as the linear relaxation of the set
of ordinary stopping times in this sense.
Fix any process A = (At)
T
t=0 and randomised stopping time χ ∈ X . Define
the processes χ∗ = (χ∗t )
T
t=0 and A
χ∗ = (Aχ∗t )
T
t=0 by
χ∗t :=
T∑
s=t
χs, A
χ∗
t :=
T∑
s=t
χsAs
for t = 0, . . . , T . For convenience also define χ∗T+1 := 0 and A
χ∗
T+1 := 0. Observe
that χ∗ is a predictable process since
χ∗t = 1−
t−1∑
s=0
χs for t = 1, . . . , T.
The value of A at χ is defined as
Aχ := A
χ∗
0 =
T∑
t=0
χtAt.
Observe that if χ = χτ for some τ ∈ T , then
χτ∗t = 1{τ≥t}, A
χτ∗
t =
T∑
s=t
1{τ=s}As = Aτ1{τ≥t}
for t = 0, . . . , T , and in particular Aχτ = Aτ .
Definition 2.4 (Approximate martingale pair). Fix any χ ∈ X . A pair (P, S)
consisting of a probability measure P and an adapted Rd-valued process S is
called a χ-approximate martingale pair if
St ∈ K∗t \ {0}, EP(Sχ∗t+1|Ft) ∈ K∗t
for all t = 0, . . . , T . If P is in addition equivalent to P , then (P, S) is called a
χ-approximate equivalent martingale pair.
Denote the family of χ-approximate equivalent pairs (P, S) by P(χ) and the
set of χ-approximate pairs by P¯(χ). For any χ ∈ X and i = 1, . . . , d define
P i(χ) := {(P, S) ∈ P(χ) : Sit = 1 for t = 0, . . . , T },
P¯ i(χ) := {(P, S) ∈ P¯(χ) : Sit = 1 for t = 0, . . . , T }.
Since P ⊆ P(χ) ⊆ P¯(χ) and K∗t is a cone for all t = 0, . . . , T , the no-arbitrage
assumption implies that P i(χ) and P¯ i(χ) are non-empty.
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Definition 2.5 (Truncated stopping time). Fix any χ ∈ X , σ ∈ T . The
truncated randomised stopping time χ ∧ σ = ((χ ∧ σ)t)Tt=0 is defined as
(χ ∧ σ)t := χt1{t<σ} + χ∗t1{t=σ} for t = 0, . . . , T.
The process χ ∧ σ is clearly adapted and nonnegative, and moreover
T∑
t=0
(χ ∧ σ)t =
σ−1∑
t=0
χt + χ
∗
σ = 1,
so it is indeed a randomised stopping time. If χ = χτ for some τ ∈ T , then
clearly (χ ∧ σ)t = 1{σ∧τ=t} for all t = 0, . . . , T , and so χτ ∧ σ = χτ∧σ. Denote
the set of randomised stopping times truncated at σ ∈ T by
X ∧ σ := {χ ∧ σ : χ ∈ X}.
3 Main results and discussion
In this section we formally define what we mean by a game option, and present
the constructions and main results.
Definition 3.1 (Game option). A game option is a derivative security that
is exercised at a stopping time τ ∈ T chosen by the buyer and cancelled at a
stopping time σ ∈ T chosen by the seller. At time σ ∧ τ the buyer receives the
payoff Qστ from the seller, where
Qst ≡ QY,X,X
′
st := Yt1{s>t} +Xs1{s<t} +X
′
s1{s=t} (3.1)
for all s, t = 0, . . . , T , and Y = (Yt)
T
t=0, X = (Xt)
T
t=0 and X
′ = (X ′t)
T
t=0 are
adapted Rd-valued processes such that
Xt −X ′t ∈ Kt, X ′t − Yt ∈ Kt (3.2)
for all t = 0, . . . , T .
In the event that the buyer exercises before the option is cancelled, i.e. on
{τ < σ}, the buyer receives the payoff Yτ from the seller at his exercise time τ .
If the seller cancels the option before it is exercised, i.e. on {σ < τ}, the seller is
required to deliver the payoff Xσ to the buyer at the cancellation time σ, which
consists of Yσ and a penalty
Xσ − Yσ = (Xσ −X ′σ) + (X ′σ − Yσ) ∈ Kσ.
In the event that the option is exercised and cancelled simultaneously, i.e. on
{σ = τ}, the seller pays X ′σ to the buyer, consisting of Yσ and a penalty
X ′σ − Yσ ∈ Kσ. The assumptions (3.2) mean that, at any time t, the portfolio
Xt payable on cancellation is at least as attractive to the buyer as the portfolio
X ′t payable in the event of simultaneous cancellation and exercise, which in turn
is at least as attractive as the portfolio Yt payable on exercise. It is therefore
clear from Definition 3.1 that a game option is essentially an American option
with payoff process Y with the additional feature that it may be cancelled by
the seller at any time (upon payment of a cancellation penalty).
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Remark 3.2. Definition 3.1 is slightly more general than the usual approach
followed in the literature (see e.g. Kifer 2000, 2013b), where the standard as-
sumption is that no penalty is paid if cancellation and exercise takes place
simultaneously (i.e. X ′t = Yt for all t) and that no penalty is paid on maturity
(i.e. XT = X
′
T = YT ). The motivation for the generalization in the present pa-
per is that it enables elegant exploitation of the symmetry between the seller’s
and buyer’s hedging problems; see Proposition 3.13. Nevertheless, from a prac-
tical point of view, the pricing and hedging problems depend on X only through
(Xt)t<T and on X
′ only through X ′T ; see the key Constructions 3.5 and 3.14 as
well as Lemma 4.1.
Remark 3.3. The property (3.2) imposes an ordering on the payoffs in the var-
ious scenarios for the seller and buyer, but there is no requirement in Defini-
tion 3.1 that any of the payoffsXt, Yt andX
′
t are solvent portfolios. The absence
of such a solvency requirement makes it easy to adapt to the buyer’s case, where
in practice the payoffs tend to be “negative” in that they correspond to portfo-
lios received rather than delivered. Typical cases are illustrated in Examples 5.1
and 5.2.
3.1 Pricing and hedging for the seller
A hedging strategy for the seller of a game option (Y,X,X ′) comprises a can-
cellation time σ and a self-financing trading strategy y that allows the seller to
the deliver the payoff without loss at any exercise time chosen by the buyer.
Definition 3.4 (Hedging strategy for the seller). A hedging strategy for the
seller is a pair (σ, y) ∈ T × Φ satisfying
yσ∧τ −Qστ ∈ Kσ∧τ for all τ ∈ T . (3.3)
There exists at least one hedging strategy for the seller. Indeed, fixing
i = 1, . . . , d and defining
m := max


d∑
j=1
piijt (ω)max{|Y jt (ω)|, |Xjt (ω)|, |X ′jt (ω)|} : t = 0, . . . , T, ω ∈ Ω

 ,
the (possibly expensive) buy-and-hold strategy y = (yt)
T
t=0 with yt = me
i for
t = 0, . . . , T hedges the game option for the seller with any choice of the cancel-
lation time σ ∈ T .
Consider now the following construction.
Construction 3.5. Construct adapted set-valued mappings (Yat )Tt=0, (X at )Tt=0,
(Uat )Tt=0, (Vat )Tt=0, (Wat )Tt=0, (Zat )Tt=0 as follows. For all t = 0, . . . , T let
Yat := Yt +Kt, X at :=
{
X ′T +KT if t = T,
Xt +Kt if t < T.
(3.4)
Define
WaT := VaT := LT , ZaT := X aT .
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For t = T − 1, . . . , 0 define by backward iteration
Wat := Zat+1 ∩ Lt, (3.5)
Vat :=Wat +Kt, (3.6)
Zat := (Vat ∩ Yat ) ∪ X at . (3.7)
For each t = 0, . . . , T , the set Yat is the collection of portfolios in Lt that
allows the seller to settle the option in the event that the buyer exercises at time t
and the seller does not cancel the option at time t. The set X at is the collection of
portfolios that allows the seller to settle the option upon cancellation at time t,
irrespective of whether the buyer exercises at time t or not. The property (3.2)
gives that
X at = (Xt +Kt) ∩ (X ′t +Kt) for t < T.
The relation X aT = X ′T + KT follows from the fact that any cancellation at the
final time T must be matched by simultaneous exercise.
The following result shows that Za0 is the set of initial endowments that
allow the seller to hedge the game option.
Proposition 3.6. We have
Za0 = {y0 : (σ, y) hedges (Y,X,X ′) for the seller}. (3.8)
It is demonstrated in the proof of Proposition 3.6, which is deferred to Sec-
tion 4, that for each t < T the sets Vat , Wat and Zat have natural interpretations
that are important to the seller of the option. The set Wat consists of those
portfolios at time t that allow the seller to hedge the option in the future (at
time t+ 1 or later), and Vat consists of those portfolios that may be rebalanced
at time t into a portfolio in Wat . The set Zat consists of all portfolios that allow
the seller to settle the option at time t or any time in the future without risk of
loss.
Construction 3.5 is essentially an iteration (backwards in time) over the
nodes of the price tree generated by the exchange rates; note in particular
that (3.5) could equivalently be written as
Waµt :=
⋂
ν∈succµ
Zaνt+1 for µ ∈ Ωt. (3.5′)
This property makes the construction particularly efficient for recombinant mod-
els, for which the number of nodes grow only polynomially with the number of
steps in the model, despite the state space growing exponentially.
The sets X at and Yat in Construction 3.5 are clearly polyhedral and non-
empty for all t = 0, . . . , T , as are VaT , WaT and ZaT . The operations in Construc-
tion 3.5 are direct addition of polyhedral cones in (3.4) and (3.6), intersection
in (3.5) and (3.7), and union in (3.7). The appearance of the union in (3.7)
means that the sets Vat , Wat and Zat may be non-convex for some t < T . How-
ever, it is clear that these sets can be written as the finite union of non-empty
(closed) polyhedra, and are therefore closed. In particular the closedness of Za0
is essential to Theorem 3.10 below.
The ask price of the game option in terms of any currency is defined as the
infimal initial endowment in that currency that would allow the seller to hedge
the game option without risk.
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Definition 3.7 (Ask price). The ask price or seller’s price or upper hedging
price of a game option (Y,X,X ′) at time 0 in terms of currency i = 1, . . . , d is
piai (Y,X,X
′) := inf{z ∈ R : (σ, y) ∈ T × Φ with y0 = zei
hedges (Y,X,X ′) for the seller}.
The existence of the buy-and-hold strategy for the seller means that the ask
price is well defined. We now present a dual representation for the ask price in
terms of randomised stopping times and approximate martingale pairs.
Theorem 3.8. The ask price of a game option (Y,X,X ′) in terms of currency
i = 1, . . . , d is
piai (Y,X,X
′) = min
σ∈T
max
χ∈X
sup
(P,S)∈Pi(χ∧σ)
EP((Qσ· · Sσ∧·)χ)
= min
σ∈T
max
χ∈X
max
(P,S)∈P¯i(χ∧σ)
EP((Qσ· · Sσ∧·)χ),
where Qσ· · Sσ∧· denotes the process (Qσt · Sσ∧t)Tt=0, in other words,
(Qσ· · Sσ∧·)χ =
σ−1∑
t=0
χtYt · St + χ∗σ+1Xσ · Sσ + χσX ′σ · Sσ.
The proof of Theorem 3.8 appears in Section 4.
Remark 3.9. Kifer (2013b, Theorem 3.1) obtained a similar dual representation
for a game option (Y,X, Y ) in a two-currency model, that does not feature the
truncated stopping time χ ∧ σ and stopped process Sσ∧·, but rather χ and S.
Example 5.2 demonstrates that these dual representations are not equivalent in
general and that the representation in Theorem 3.8 is indeed the correct one.
The reason for the difference between the two representations can be ex-
plained intuitively in the following way. The proof of Theorem 3.8 hinges on
the fact that a pair (σ, y) hedges the game option for the seller if and only if y
hedges an American option with payoff process Hσ (defined in (4.1)) and ran-
dom expiration date σ for the seller. By contrast, the proof of Theorem 3.1 of
Kifer (2013b) claims that (σ, y) hedges the game option (Y,X, Y ) for the seller if
and only if y hedges an American option with payoff process
(
QY,X,Yσt
)T
t=0
and
expiration date T (rather than σ) for the seller. This claim does not hold true
in general, because hedging such an American option would require the seller to
be in a position to deliver Qσt = Xσ on {σ > t} at any time t, in other words,
after the option has already been cancelled. As evidenced in Example 5.2, the
non-equivalence is most easily noticed when transaction costs are large at time
σ and/or Xσ is a non-solvent portfolio.
Returning to the problem of computing the ask price of a game option, the
following result is a direct consequence of Proposition 3.6 and the closedness of
Za0 .
Theorem 3.10. We have
piai (Y,X,X
′) = min{x ∈ R : xei ∈ Za0 }. (3.9)
Moreover, there exists a hedging strategy (σˆ, yˆ) for the seller such that yˆ0 =
piai (Y,X,X
′)ei.
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A hedging strategy (σ, y) for the seller is called optimal if it satisfies the
properties in Theorem 3.10. A procedure for constructing such a strategy can
be extracted from the proof of Proposition 3.6.
Construction 3.11. Construct an optimal strategy (σˆ, yˆ) for the seller as fol-
lows. Let
yˆ0 := pi
a
i (Y,X,X
′)ei.
For each t = 0, . . . , T − 1 and µ ∈ Ωt, if yˆµt ∈ Zaµt \ X aµt , then choose any
yˆµt+1 ∈ Waµt ∩ [yˆµt −Kµt ] , (3.10)
otherwise put yˆµt+1 := yˆ
µ
t . Also define
σˆ := min {t : yˆt ∈ X at } .
The optimal strategy for the seller is not unique in general; this is reflected
in the choice (3.10). In practice the seller might use secondary considerations,
such as a preference for holding certain currencies over others, or optimality of
a secondary hedging criterion, to guide the construction of a suitable optimal
hedging strategy.
Two toy examples illustrating Constructions 3.5 and 3.11 and Theorem 3.8,
as well as a third example with a more realistic flavour can be found in Section 5.
3.2 Pricing and hedging for the buyer
Consider now the hedging, pricing and optimal exercise problem for the buyer
of a game option (Y,X,X ′).
Definition 3.12 (Hedging strategy for the buyer). A hedging strategy for the
buyer is a pair (τ, y) ∈ T × Φ satisfying
yσ∧τ +Qστ ∈ Kσ∧τ for all σ ∈ T , (3.11)
where the payoff process Q is defined in (3.1).
Observe from (3.1) that
Qστ = Q
Y,X,X′
στ = −Q−X,−Y,−X
′
τσ for all σ, τ ∈ T , (3.12)
and moreover from (3.2) that for all t = 0, . . . , T
−Yt − (−X ′t) = X ′t − Yt ∈ Kt,
−X ′t − (−Xt) = Xt −X ′t ∈ Kt.
Thus if (Y,X,X ′) is the payoff of a game option, then so is (−X,−Y,−X ′), and
(3.11) is equivalent to
yτ∧σ −Q−X,−Y,−X′τσ ∈ Kτ∧σ for all σ ∈ T .
Thus we arrive at the following result.
Proposition 3.13. A pair (τ, y) ∈ T × Φ hedges the game option (Y,X,X ′)
for the buyer if and only if (τ, y) hedges the game option (−X,−Y,−X ′) for the
seller.
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This symmetry means that the results and constructions developed in the
previous subsection for the seller’s case can also be applied to the hedging and
pricing problem for the buyer, thus substantiating the claim by Kifer (2013b,
pp. 679–80). In particular, Construction 3.5 can be applied directly, provided
that Yat and X at in (3.4) is redefined to take into account the fact that the option
is now (−X,−Y,−X ′) rather than (Y,X,X ′). The resulting construction reads
as follows.
Construction 3.14. For all t let
Ybt := −Xt +Kt, X bt :=
{
−X ′T +KT if t = T,
−Yt +Kt if t < T.
Define
WbT := VbT := LT , ZbT := X bT .
For t = T − 1, . . . , 0 let
Wbt := Zbt+1 ∩ Lt, Vbt :=Wbt +Kbt , Zbt := (Vbt ∩ Ybt ) ∪ X bt .
It follows directly from Theorem 3.6 that Zb0 is the set of initial endowments
that allow the buyer to hedge the option, i.e.
Zb0 = {z : (τ, y) ∈ T × Φ with y0 = zei hedges (Y,X,X ′) for the buyer}.
The bid price of a game option in any currency is the largest amount that
the buyer can raise in that currency at time 0 by using the payoff of the option
as a guarantee.
Definition 3.15 (Bid price). The bid price or lower hedging price or buyer’s
price of a game option (Y,X,X ′) in currency i = 1, . . . , d is defined as
pibi (Y,X,X
′) := sup{−z : (τ, y) ∈ T × Φ with y0 = zei
superhedges (Y,X,X ′) for the buyer}.
Proposition 3.13 and Construction 3.14 give that
pibi (Y,X,X
′) = −piai (−X,−Y,−X ′) = − inf
{
z : zei ∈ Zb0
}
. (3.13)
A hedging strategy (τ, y) for the buyer is called optimal if y0 = −pibi (Y,X,X ′)ei.
Optimal hedging strategies can be generated by rewriting Construction 3.11 as
follows.
Construction 3.16. Construct an optimal strategy (τˇ , yˇ) for the buyer as
follows. Let
yˇ0 := −pibi (Y,X,X ′)ei.
For each t = 0, . . . , T − 1 and µ ∈ Ωt, if yˇµt ∈ Zbµt \ X bµt , then choose any
yˇµt+1 ∈ Wbµt ∩ [yˇµt −Kµt ] , (3.14)
otherwise put yˇµt+1 := yˇ
µ
t . Also define
τˇ := min
{
t : yˇt ∈ X bt
}
.
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A toy example illustrating Constructions 3.14 and 3.16 can be found in
Section 5. It demonstrates that the optimal cancellation time σˆ for the seller
and the optimal exercise time τˇ for the buyer are not the same in general, and
these times may also be different from the stopping time σˆ ∧ τˇ at which the
option payoff is paid.
Finally, combining Theorem 3.8 with (3.12) and (3.13) immediately gives
the following dual representation for the bid price.
Theorem 3.17. We have
pibi (Y,X,X
′) = max
τ∈T
min
χ∈X
inf
(P,S)∈Pi(χ∧τ)
EP((Q·τ · S·∧τ)χ)
= max
τ∈T
min
χ∈X
min
(P,S)∈P¯i(χ∧τ)
EP((Q·τ · S·∧τ)χ),
where Q·τ · S·∧τ denotes the process (QY,X,X′sτ · Ss∧τ )Ts=0, i.e.
(Q·τ · S·∧τ )χ =
τ−1∑
s=0
χsXs · Ss + χ∗τ+1Yτ · Sτ + χτX ′τ · Sτ .
The representation in Theorem 3.17 is different from the representation by
Kifer (2013b, Theorem 3.1) for a game option (Y,X,X ′) in a two-currency
model, for reasons already discussed in the context of Theorem 3.8; see Re-
mark 3.9.
4 Proofs of results for the seller’s case
Proof of Proposition 3.6. Fix any z ∈ Za0 . We claim that there exists a hedging
strategy (σ, y) for the seller with y0 = z. To this end, we construct y = (yt)
T
t=0
together with a non-decreasing sequence (σt)
T
t=0 of stopping times. Define
y0 := z, σ0 :=
{
0 if z ∈ X a0 ,
1 if z ∈ Za0 \ X a0 .
If σ0 = 0, let y1 := y0. If σ0 = 1, then
y0 ∈ Za0 \ X a0 ⊆ Va0 ∩ Ya0 ⊆ Wa0 +K0,
so that there exists some y1 ∈ Wa0 such that y0 − y1 ∈ K0 and y1 ∈ Za1 .
Suppose by induction that for some t > 0 we have constructed y0, . . . , yt
and non-decreasing σ0, . . . , σt−1 such that for s = 0, . . . , t − 1 we have ys+1
being Fs-measurable, σs ≤ s + 1, ys − ys+1 ∈ Ks, yσs ∈ X aσs on {σs ≤ s} and
yu ∈ Zau \ X au on {σs > u} for all u = 0, . . . , s. Define
σt := σt−11{σt−1<t} + t1{σt−1=t}∩{yt∈Xat } + (t+ 1)1{σt−1=t}∩{yt∈Zat \Xat }.
On the set
{σt > t} = {σt = t+ 1} = {σt−1 = t} ∩ {yt ∈ Zat \ X at }
we have
yt ∈ Zat \ X at ⊆ Vat ∩ Yat ⊆ Vat =Wat +Kt,
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so there exists an Ft-measurable random variable x ∈ Zat+1 such that yt−x ∈ Kt
on this set. Now define the Ft-measurable random variable
yt+1 := x1{σt=t+1} + yt1{σt≤t}.
Since 0 ∈ Kt we have yt − yt+1 ∈ Kt. Moreover,
yσt = yσt1{σt<t} + yt1{σt=t} + yt+11{σt=t+1}
= yσt−11{σt<t} + yt1{σt−1=t}∩{yt∈Xat } + yt+11{σt=t+1}
so yσt ∈ X aσt on the set
{σt ≤ t} = {σt−1 < t} ∪ [{σt−1 = t} ∩ {yt ∈ X at }].
This concludes the inductive step.
Let σ := σT ; then the pair (σ, y) ∈ T × Φ satisfies
yσ ∈ X aσ , yt ∈ Zat \ X at on {t < σ} for t = 0, . . . , T − 1.
Fix any stopping time τ . On {τ < σ} we have
yτ ∈ Zaτ \ X aτ ⊆ Vaτ ∩ Yτ ⊆ Yτ = Yτ +Kτ .
On the set {τ = σ} we have yσ ∈ X aσ ⊆ X ′σ + Kσ. On the set {τ > σ} we have
σ < τ ≤ T and yσ ∈ X aσ = Xσ + Kσ. Thus yσ∧τ −Qστ ∈ Kσ∧τ , from which it
follows that (σ, y) hedges the game option for the seller.
Conversely, suppose that (σ, y) hedges the game option for the seller. We
show by backward induction that yt ∈ Zat on {t ≤ σ} and yt ∈ Vat ∩ Yat on
{t < σ} for all t = 0, . . . , T , from which it can be deduced that z = y0 ∈ Za0 ,
which completes the proof. At time T we have {T = σ} = {T ≤ σ}, so clearly
yT ∈ X ′T +KT = X aT = ZaT on {T ≤ σ}.
For any t < T , suppose that yt+1 ∈ Zat+1 on {t + 1 ≤ σ} = {t < σ}. This
means that yt+1 ∈ Wat on {t < σ} as yt+1 ∈ Lt. Moreover yt−yt+1 ∈ Kt implies
that yt ∈ Vat on {t < σ}, and therefore
yt ∈ Vat ∩ [Yt +Kt] = Vat ∩ Yat ⊆ Zat on {t < σ}.
On the set {t = σ} = {t ≤ σ} \ {t < σ} we have yt ∈ Xt+Kt = X at ⊆ Zat . This
concludes the induction.
The next result will play an important role in the proof of Theorem 3.8.
Define the auxiliary process
Hst ≡ H(Y,X,X
′)
st := Yt1{s>t} +Xs1{s=t<T} +X
′
s1{s=t=T} (4.1)
for all s, t = 0, . . . , T . Observe that the process Hσ = (Hσt)
T
t=0 is adapted for
any σ ∈ T , and that Hσt = Qσt = Yt on {σ > t} and Hσt = 0 on {σ < t} for
all t = 0, . . . , T .
The payoffHσt can be interpreted as the payoff that a seller with pre-selected
cancellation time σ needs to be prepared to deliver at time t if it is known that
the buyer will not exercise at the same time as when the option is cancelled
(except at time t = T ); this is effectively the worst case scenario for such a
seller because of (3.2).
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Lemma 4.1. A pair (σ, y) ∈ T ×Φ hedges the game option for the seller if and
only if
yσ∧τ −Hστ ∈ Kσ∧τ for all τ ∈ T . (4.2)
Proof. Throughout the proof we shall make frequent and implicit use of the fact
that Kt is a pointed cone for all t, and in particular the property 0 ∈ Kt.
Fix any (σ, y) ∈ T × Φ satisfying (4.2). In view of (4.1), this implies that
(yσ∧τ − Yσ∧τ )1{σ>τ} ∈ Kσ∧τ for all τ ∈ T , (4.3)
(yσ −Xσ)1{σ=τ<T} ∈ Kσ∧τ for all τ ∈ T , (4.4)
(yσ −X ′σ)1{σ=τ=T} ∈ Kσ∧τ . for all τ ∈ T , (4.5)
Substituting τ = 0, . . . , T − 1 into (4.4) and τ = T into (4.5) gives
(yσ −Xσ)1{σ<T} ∈ Kσ, (4.6)
(yσ −X ′σ)1{σ=T} ∈ Kσ. (4.7)
Property (3.2) together with (4.6)–(4.7) then leads to yσ −X ′σ ∈ Kσ, whence
(yσ∧τ −X ′σ∧τ )1{σ=τ} = (yσ −X ′σ)1{σ=τ}
∈ 1{σ=τ}Kσ = 1{σ=τ}Kσ∧τ ⊆ Kσ∧τ for all τ ∈ T . (4.8)
It also follows from (4.6) that
(yσ∧τ −Xσ∧τ )1{σ<τ} = (yσ −Xσ)1{σ<τ} = (yσ −Xσ)1{σ<T}1{σ<τ}
∈ 1{σ<τ}Kσ = 1{σ<τ}Kσ∧τ ⊆ Kσ∧τ for all τ ∈ T . (4.9)
Properties (4.3), (4.8) and (4.9) lead to (3.3), and so (σ, y) hedges the game
option for the seller.
Suppose conversely that (σ, y) ∈ T ×Φ hedges the game option for the seller.
Property (3.3) gives (4.3) and (upon choosing τ = T )
yσ −Xσ1{σ<T} −X ′σ1{σ=T} ∈ Kσ,
from which it follows that
(yσ∧τ −Xσ)1{σ=τ<T} + (yσ∧τ −X ′σ)1{σ=τ=T}
= yσ∧τ1{σ=τ} −Xσ1{σ=τ<T} −X ′σ1{σ=τ=T}
=
(
yσ∧τ −Xσ1{σ<T} −X ′σ1{σ=T}
)
1{σ=τ}
=
(
yσ −Xσ1{σ<T} −X ′σ1{σ=T}
)
1{σ=τ}
∈ 1{σ=τ}Kσ = 1{σ=τ}Kσ∧τ ⊆ Kσ∧τ for all τ ∈ T . (4.10)
Properties (4.3) and (4.10) together give (4.2), which completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 3.8. Lemma 4.1 shows that, for σ ∈ T given, the pair (σ, y) ∈
T ×Φ hedges the game option (Y,X,X ′) for the seller if and only if (4.2) holds,
equivalently
yτ −Hστ ∈ Kτ for all τ ∈ T such that τ ≤ σ.
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Definition 3.7 and the finiteness of T then give that
piai (Y,X,X
′)
= min
σ∈T
inf{z ∈ R : (σ, y) hedges (Y,X,X ′) for the seller and y0 = zei}
= min
σ∈T
pai (σ),
where
pai (σ) := inf{z ∈ R : y ∈ Φ such that
y0 = ze
i, yτ −Hστ ∈ Kτ for all τ ∈ T , τ ≤ σ}. (4.11)
This means that any pair (σ, y) hedges the game option (Y,X,X ′) for the
seller if and only if, in the terminology of Roux & Zastawniak (2015), the strat-
egy y superhedges an option with payoff process Hσ = (Hσt)
T
t=0 that can be
exercised by the buyer at any stopping time τ satisfying
{τ = t} ⊆ Et := {t ≤ σ} for all t = 0, . . . , T
for the seller. Intuitively, this is an American option with (random) expiration
date σ. The quantity pai (σ) in (4.11) is the ask price of such an option in asset i,
and Roux & Zastawniak (2015, Theorem 3) established that
pai (σ) = max
χ∈XE
sup
(P,S)∈Pi(χ)
EP((Hσ · S)χ) = max
χ∈XE
max
(P,S)∈P¯i(χ)
EP((Hσ · S)χ)
where Hσ · S = (Hσt · St)Tt=0 and
X E := {χ ∈ X : {χt > 0} ⊆ Et for all t = 0, . . . , T } = X ∧ σ.
It then follows that
pai (σ) = max
χ∈X
sup
(P,S)∈Pi(χ∧σ)
EP((Hσ ·S)χ∧σ) = max
χ∈X
max
(P,S)∈P¯i(χ∧σ)
EP((Hσ ·S)χ∧σ),
(4.12)
so that
piai (Y,X,X
′) = min
σ∈T
max
χ∈X
sup
(P,S)∈Pi(χ∧σ)
EP((Hσ · S)χ∧σ)
= min
σ∈T
max
χ∈X
max
(P,S)∈P¯i(χ∧σ)
EP((Hσ · S)χ∧σ). (4.13)
Fix now any σ ∈ T , χ ∈ X and (P, S) ∈ P¯(χ ∧ σ) and note that
(Hσ · S)χ∧σ
= (Qσ· · Sσ∧·)χ + (χ∗σ1{σ<T} − χ∗σ+1)Xσ · Sσ + (χ∗σ1{σ=T} − χσ)X ′σ · Sσ
= (Qσ· · Sσ∧·)χ +
(
χσ1{σ<T} − χ∗σ+11{σ=T}
)
Xσ · Sσ − χσ1{σ<T}X ′σ · Sσ
= (Qσ· · Sσ∧·)χ + χσ1{σ<T}(Xσ −X ′σ) · Sσ. (4.14)
This follows from the properties of χ∗: in particular χ∗T+1 = 0, χ
∗
T = χT and
χ∗σ = χ
∗
σ+1 + χσ. Since Xσ −X ′σ ∈ Kσ by (3.2) and Sσ ∈ K∗σ, we immediately
have
(Hσ · S)χ∧σ ≥ (Qσ· · Sσ∧·)χ. (4.15)
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Figure 1: Game option in binary two-step two-currency model, Example 5.1
Define the stopping time χ′ = (χ′t) ∈ X by
χ′t := χt1{t<σ} + χ
∗
σ1{t=T} for t = 0, . . . , T ;
then χ ∧ σ = χ′ ∧ σ and so (P, S) ∈ P¯(χ′ ∧ σ). Moreover, since χ′σ1{σ<T} = 0
it follows from (4.14) that
(Hσ · S)χ∧σ = (Hσ · S)χ′∧σ = (Qσ· · Sσ∧·)χ′ . (4.16)
Combining (4.15) and (4.16) then gives
max
χ∈X
max
(P,S)∈P¯i(χ∧σ)
EP((Hσ · S)χ∧σ) = max
χ∈X
max
(P,S)∈P¯i(χ∧σ)
EP((Qσ· · Sσ∧·)χ),
and the result follows from (4.13).
5 Numerical examples
Three numerical examples are presented in this section. The first is a toy ex-
ample to illustrate the constructions in Section 3. The second illustrates Theo-
rem 3.8 and serves as a minimal counterexample to Theorem 3.1 of Kifer (2013b).
The final example has a more realistic flavour.
Example 5.1. A game option (Y,X,X ′) in a binary two-step two-currency
model is presented in Figure 1. The model is recombinant and has transaction
costs only at node u at time 1, and the option is path-independent and has no
cancellation penalties at time 2.
Let us use Construction 3.5 to find the set of hedging endowments for the
seller. Clearly
Zauu2 =
{(
x1, x2
) ∈ R2 : 16x1 + x2 ≥ 9} ,
Zaud2 =
{(
x1, x2
) ∈ R2 : 10x1 + x2 ≥ 4} ,
Zadd2 =
{(
x1, x2
) ∈ R2 : 4x1 + x2 ≥ 0}
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Figure 2: Wau1 , Vau1 , Vau1 ∩ Yau1 , Zau1 and yˆ1, Example 5.1
at time t = 2.
For time t = 1, consider the node u. We obtain Wau1 from (3.5′) and Vau1
from (3.6); both procedures are shown graphically in Figure 2. Observe that the
magnitude of the transaction costs at this node means that Wau1 + Ku1 =Wau1 ,
whence Vau1 = Wau1 . The next step is to compute Zau1 from (3.7). As shown
in Figure 2, this can be done by finding the intersection of Vau1 and Yau1 first
and then taking the union with X au1 . The non-convexity of Zau1 is due to the
magnitude of the transaction costs and the shape of the payoff at this node.
Similar considerations at the node d give that
Zad1 = X ad1 =
{(
x1, x2
)
: 6x1 + x2 ≥ 1} . (5.1)
Finally, following the same steps for time t = 0 results in the sets of portfolios
Wa0 , Va0 and Za0 depicted in Figure 3. The ask prices of the game option in the
two currencies are the intersections of the lower boundary of Za0 with the axes,
and so can be read directly from the final graph in Figure 3, namely
pia1 (Y,X,X
′) = 25 , pi
a
2 (Y,X,X
′) = 4.
Consider now the buyer’s case. Observe in the context of Remark 3.3 that
(−X,−Y,−X ′) satisfies the conditions of Definition 3.1, even though some of
the payoff portfolios are not solvent, for example, −X0 = (0,−5) /∈ K0.
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Figure 3: Wa0 , Va0 , Va0 ∩ Ya0 , Za0 and yˆ0, Example 5.1
Construction 3.14 and similar calculations as in the seller’s case yield
Zbuu2 =
{(
x1, x2
) ∈ R2 : 16x1 + x2 ≥ −9} ,
Zbud2 = Zbdu2 =
{(
x1, x2
) ∈ R2 : 10x1 + x2 ≥ −4} ,
Zbdd2 =
{(
x1, x2
) ∈ R2 : 4x1 + x2 ≥ 0} ,
Zbu1 =
{(
x1, x2
) ∈ R2 : 16x1 + x2 ≥ −4, 8x1 + x2 ≥ −4} ,
Zbd1 =
{(
x1, x2
) ∈ R2 : 6x1 + x2 ≥ −1} ,
Zb0 =
{(
x1, x2
) ∈ R2 : 6x1 + x2 ≥ − 115 }
together with the bid prices
pib1(Y,X,X
′) = 1150 , pi
b
2(Y,X,X
′) = 115 .
Let us use Construction 3.16 to find an optimal hedging strategy (τˇ , yˇ) for
the buyer in the scenario uu from the initial value yˇ0 :=
(
0,− 115
)
. Clearly
yˇ0 /∈ X b0 = K0 and so τˇ > 0. As can be seen from Figure 5.1,
Wb0 ∩ [yˇ0 −K0] =
{(− 310 , 45)}
and so yˇ1 =
(− 310 , 45) by (3.14). Observing that
yˇ1 /∈ X bu1 =
{(
x1, x2
) ∈ R2 : 16x1 + x2 ≥ −3, 8x1 + x2 ≥ −3} ,
in other words that τˇ (uu) > 1, we proceed to select yˇu2 . Figure 5.1 also shows
that
Wbu1 ∩ [yˇ1 −Ku1 ] = conv
{
yˇ1,
(− 3740 , 295 ) , (− 56 , 133 ) , (0,−4)} ,
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Figure 5: Game option in binary single-step two-currency model, Example 5.2
so there is some freedom in the selection of yˇu2 . In fact
Wbu1 ∩ [yˇ1 −Ku1 ] ⊆ X buu2 =
{(
x1, x2
) ∈ R2 : 16x1 + x2 ≥ −9} ,
which means that every choice of yˇu2 ∈ Wbu1 ∩ [yˇ1 −Ku1 ] would enable the buyer
to exercise the option at time 2 at the node uu and remain in (or return to) a
solvent position. It is also clear that τˇ(uu) = 2.
Returning to the seller, it is straightforward to use Construction 3.11 to cre-
ate an optimal hedging strategy (σˆ, yˆ) for the seller from the initial endowment
yˆ0 := (0, 4). From Figure 3 it is clear that yˆ0 /∈ X a0 (and so σˆ > 0), and also
that
Wa0 ∩ [yˆ0 −K0] = {(0, 4)} = {yˆ0} ,
and so by (3.10) we must choose yˆ1 := yˆ0. Figure 2 and (5.1) shows that
yˆ1 /∈ X a1 and so σˆ = 1. This means that if the seller follows (σˆ, yˆ) and the buyer
(τˇ , yˇ), then in scenario uu the option will be cancelled (but not exercised) at
the node u, at which time the seller delivers (0, 4) to the buyer.
Example 5.2. Figure 5 presents a game option (Y,X, Y ) in a binary single-
step two-currency model. The implied assumptionX ′ = Y is conventional in the
game options literature (cf. Remark 3.2). Note also that the option satisfies Def-
inition 3.1 despite the fact that neither Y0 nor X0 are solvent (cf. Remark 3.3).
It would be tempting for the seller to cancel the option at time 0, because
delivering X0 to the buyer at time 0 is effectively the same as receiving the
portfolio (15,−1), which the seller could immediately convert into
15− pi120 = 2 > 0
19
Za
0
−15 −2 25 84
−7
− 27
13
1
x
1
x
2
z0
−15
−2
25
84
−7 − 27
13
1
x
2
x
1
Figure 6: Za0 and z0, Example 5.2
units of currency 1. If the buyer exercises at time 0 then the seller is in an
even better position, because −Y0 could similarly be converted into 7 units of
currency 1. Applying Construction 3.5 to this option gives the set Za0 presented
in Figure 6. Clearly
pia1 (Y,X, Y ) = −2,
which means that cancellation at time 0 is indeed optimal for the seller. Theo-
rem 3.2(i) of Kifer (2013b) constructs a function z0, also shown in Figure 6, and
gives the ask price as
z0(0) = −2 = pia1 (Y,X, Y ).
Note that Za0 is the epigraph of z0, reflected around the line x1 = x2; in other
words, Za0 would have been the epigraph for z0 had the currencies had been
ordered differently.
We will compare the dual representations for pia1 (Y,X, Y ) in Theorem 3.8
above and Theorem 3.1 of Kifer (2013b). The model has only two stopping
times, 0 and 1, and so this can be done easily and directly. Observe also that
K∗0 = cone {(1, 10) , (1, 13)} ,
K∗u1 = cone {(1, 12)} ⊂ K∗0 ,
K∗d1 = cone {(1, 9)} .
This means (cf. Definition 2.4) that the property (P, S) =
(
P,
(
S1, S2
)) ∈ P¯1(χ)
is equivalent to
P(u) ≥ 13 , P(d) = 1− P(u) ≥ 0,
together with
S10 = S
1
1 = 1, 10 ≤ S20 ≤ 13, S21(u) = 12, S21(d) = 9.
For the representation for pia1 (Y,X, Y ) in Theorem 3.8, take first σ = 0. For
every χ ∈ X and (P, S) ∈ P¯1(χ ∧ 0) we have
(Q0· · S0∧·)χ = χ∗1X0 · S0 + χ0Y0 · S0 = −5χ0 − 15 + S20 ,
20
and therefore
max
χ∈X
max
(P,S)∈P¯1(χ∧0)
EP((Q0· · S0∧·)χ)
= max{−5χ0 − 15 + S20 : χ0 ∈ [0, 1], S20 ∈ [10, 13]} = −2.
Similarly, for σ = 1,
(Q1· · S1∧·)χ = χ0Y0 · S0 + χ∗2X1 · S1 + χ1Y1 · S1 = χ0(S20 − 20)
and so
max
χ∈X
max
(P,S)∈P¯1(χ∧1)
EP((Q1· · S1∧·)χ)
= max{χ0(S20 − 20) : χ0 ∈ [0, 1], S20 ∈ [10, 13]} = 0. (5.2)
Finally,
min
σ∈T
max
χ∈X
max
(P,S)∈P¯1(χ∧σ)
EP((Qσ· · Sσ∧·)χ) = min{−2, 0} = −2 = pia1 (Y,X, Y )
as expected.
Now turn to the dual representation in Theorem 3.1 of Kifer (2013b). It can
be written in our notation as
V a := min
σ∈T
max
χ∈X
max
(P,S)∈P¯1(χ)
EP((Qσ· · S)χ),
where
(Qσ· · S)χ =
σ∑
t=0
χtYt · St +
T∑
t=σ+1
χtXσ · St
and T = 1. For σ = 1, the calculation (5.2) gives that
max
χ∈X
max
(P,S)∈P¯1(χ)
EP((Q1· · S)χ) = max
χ∈X
max
(P,S)∈P¯1(χ∧1)
EP((Q1· · S1∧·)χ) = 0.
For σ = 0 and every χ ∈ X and (P, S) ∈ P¯1(χ) we have
(Qσ· · S)χ = χ0Y0 · S0 + χ1X0 · S1 = χ0(S20 − 5) + (1− χ0)S21 − 15,
so that
EP((Q0· · S)χ) = χ0(S20 − 5) + (1− χ0)(3P(u) + 9)− 15.
This means that
max
χ∈X
max
(P,S)∈P¯1(χ)
EP((Q0· · S)χ)
= max{χ0(S20 − 5) + (1− χ0)(3P(u) + 9)− 15
: χ0 ∈ [0, 1], S20 ∈ [10, 13],P(u) ∈ [ 13 , 1]} = −3.
Finally,
V a = min{0,−3} = −3 6= pia1 (Y,X, Y ),
which demonstrates that V a is not the correct dual representation for pia1 (Y,X, Y ).
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Example 5.3. Consider a three-currency model with T steps and time hori-
zon 1 based on the two-asset recombinant Korn-Muller model (Korn & Mu¨ller
2009) with Cholesky decomposition, i.e. friction-free exchange rates in terms of
currency 3 are modelled by the process (St)
T
t=0, where
St =
(
ε1tS
1
t−1, ε
2
tS
2
t−1, 1
)
for t = 1, . . . , T
and (εt)
T
t=1 =
((
ε1t , ε
2
t
))T
t=1
is a sequence of independent identically distributed
random variables taking the values(
e−
1
2
σ2
1
∆−σ1
√
∆, e−
1
2
σ2
2
∆−(ρ+
√
1−ρ2)σ2
√
∆
)
,(
e−
1
2
σ2
1
∆−σ1
√
∆, e−
1
2
σ2
2
∆−(ρ−
√
1−ρ2)σ2
√
∆
)
,(
e−
1
2
σ2
1
∆+σ1
√
∆, e−
1
2
σ2
2
∆+(ρ−
√
1−ρ2)σ2
√
∆
)
,(
e−
1
2
σ2
1
∆+σ1
√
∆, e−
1
2
σ2
2
∆+(ρ+
√
1−ρ2)σ2
√
∆
)
,
each with positive probability, where ∆ := 1
T
is the step size. The exchange
rates with transaction costs are modelled as
piijt :=
{
S
j
t
Sit
(1 + k) if i 6= j,
1 if i = j,
for i, j = 1, . . . , 3 and t ≤ T , where k ∈ [0, 1). We take(
S10 , S
2
0
)
= (40, 50) , σ1 = 0.15, σ2 = 0.1, ρ = 0.5.
Consider a game put option with physical delivery on a basket containing
one unit each of currencies 1 and 2 and with strike K in currency 3, i.e.
Yt = (−1,−1,K) for t = 0, . . . , T.
On cancellation the seller delivers the above payoff to the buyer, together with
a cancellation penalty p ≥ 0 in currency 3, so that
Xt = X
′
t = (−1,−1,K + p) for t = 0, . . . , T.
We allow for the possibility that the seller may choose not to cancel the option,
and the buyer may choose not to exercise, by adding an additional time step
T + 1 and taking
YT+1 = XT+1 = X
′
T+1 = (0, 0, 0) .
Except for the union, the operations in Constructions 3.5 and 3.14, namely
intersection and direct addition of a polyhedral cone, are standard geometric
procedures when applied to polyhedra, and can be implemented using existing
software libraries. Both these operations are union-preserving, and so the ex-
tension to unions of polyhedra is straightforward. The numerical results below
were produced using Maple with the Convex package (Franz 2009).
Table 1 contains bid and ask prices in currency 3 of the basket put with
penalty p = 5 for a range of strike prices. Both bid and ask prices increase with
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k = 0 k = 0.005
K pib3 pi
a
3 pi
b
3 pi
a
3
100 10.043290 11.033942 9.568590 11.687749
95 5.266479 6.817389 4.706543 7.480028
90 0.967824 2.774598 0.367975 3.423798
85 −2.934360 −1.091048 −3.587214 −0.444708
80 −6.910514 −5.131149 −7.584034 −4.614029
Table 1: Bid and ask prices of game basket put option with N = 10, p = 5 and
different strikes K, Example 5.3
k = 0 k = 0.005
p pib3 pi
a
3 pi
b
3 pi
a
3
0 10.000000 10.000000 9.550000 10.447761
1 10.014709 10.278348 9.556726 10.790910
2 10.027095 10.497310 9.562075 11.051351
5 10.043290 11.033942 9.568590 11.687749
10 10.050958 11.571315 9.571850 12.297913
20 10.052026 11.796921 9.572414 12.575621
American 10.052027 11.812658 9.572414 12.589930
Table 2: Bid and ask prices of game basket put option with N = 10, K = 100
and different penalties, Example 5.3
the strike. Note the appearance of negative bid and ask prices for out-of-the-
money options (i.e. K < S10 + S
2
0 = 90). The reason for this is that the seller
can cancel the option at any time, and cancellation tends to be particularly
attractive to the seller (and very costly for the buyer) when the option is far
out of the money; for example, if K = 80 then, from the point of view of the
seller, cancelling the option at time 0 is equivalent to receiving the basket from
the buyer and paying K + p = 85 in currency 3, which is less than the market
price S10 + S
2
0 = 90 (ignoring transaction costs) of the basket.
Bid and ask prices of the game basket put with strike K = 100 and a range
of penalty values are reported in Table 2, together with bid and ask prices
of the American basket put with the same strike (using the constructions of
Roux & Zastawniak (2015)). In practical terms, game options with large penal-
ties resemble American options (because larger penalties make it less attractive
for the seller to cancel the option early), and this explains the convergence of
the bid and ask prices of the game option to that of the American option as the
penalty increases.
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